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The just war tradition is one of the key constituencies of international political theory, and its vocab-
ulary plays a prominent role in how political and military leaders frame contemporary conflicts. Yet,
it stands in danger of turning in on itself and becoming irrelevant. This article argues that scholars
who wish to preserve the vitality of this tradition must think in a more open-textured fashion about its
historiography. One way to achieve this is to problematize the boundaries of the tradition. This article
pursues this objective by treating one figure that stands in a liminal relation to the just war tradition.
Despite having a lot to say about the ethics of war, Xenophon is seldom acknowledged as a bona fide
just war thinker. The analysis presented here suggests, however, that his writings have much to tell
us, not only about how he and his contemporaries thought about the ethics of war, but about how just
war thinking is understood (and delimited) today and how it might be revived as a pluralistic critical
enterprise.
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What is at stake when one refers to just war tradition
rather than just war theory? To insist on thinking about
just war as a tradition entails rejecting the idea that it re-
duces to a single, coherent, axiomatic theory. Approach-
ing just war in this way involves conceiving of it as a his-
torically continuous collection of closely related but often
competing voices that, when viewed in concert, form a
sustained body of thought and practice.1 As such, think-
ing about just war as a tradition means engaging it in
1 Nardin (1992, 3) defines traditions as “resilient but not
immutable practices that are constantly modified in
use.”
its totality, as a rolling story, rather than as an index of
discrete individuated contributions (Johnson 2009, 252).
Proponents of this approach argue that not only does it
afford us a deeper and more historically contextualized
understanding of the various moral categories and prin-
ciples that just war thinking both relies upon and trades
in (e.g., just cause, proper authority), it also furnishes us
with a more variegated and potentially critical perspec-
tive upon how those same categories and principles are
employed today.2
It is disappointing, then, to note that scholars who
approach just war as a tradition tend to sell themselves
short by focusing on the same selection of authorita-
tive figures (e.g., Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria, Grotius)
2 The key proponents of this approach are Johnson (2006)
and Kelsay (2013). Their approach shares certain simi-
laritieswith aspects of Skinner’s approach to the history
of political thought (2002).
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at the expense of a wider range of thinkers.3 Presum-
ably scholars have trained their exegeses on these figures
because they made seminal contributions to the devel-
opment of the tradition. This is fine insofar as it goes.
But the possibility must also be entertained that the fail-
ure to look beyond the usual suspects reflects a failure
of historical imagination. On this account the focus on a
restricted range of thinkers represents a slide into “tra-
ditionalism,” that is, a preference for deferring to and
working within the established canon (Pelikan 1984, 64).
The result is problematic: a discourse that is unduly nar-
row and which reproduces itself at the expense of fresh
thinking (O’Driscoll 2013, 53–56). Scholars who pursue
this approach jeopardize the vitality of the tradition—its
protean character, its adaptability, its relevance—by turn-
ing it into a dusty indulgence for antiquarians.
The purpose of this article is to argue that this situ-
ation can be remedied and to propose a model for how
this might be achieved. The idea is simple. It is to extend
the historiography of the just war tradition to include a
wider range of figures, with a special emphasis on those
who are liminal to the tradition. The intention is not to
press a case for including this or that figure among the
list of the great and the good of the just war tradition.
Rather, it is simply to expand the discourse as a means
of encouraging more reflexive and open-textured think-
ing about the boundaries of the tradition and how they
have come to be understood. If scholars are convinced
of the utility of thinking about just war as a tradition,
but also wish to avoid the flaccid conservatism that is a
by-product of recycling the same old canonical texts, this
represents a viable way forward. In essence, what we are
talking about is a recovery of historical imagination.
This could take a number of forms. It could, for in-
stance, involve an opening up of the discourse to en-
gage non-Western approaches to thinking ethically about
war. The comparative ethics of war is a fertile area
for research. Work in this field exhibits a commitment
to viewing just war thinking alongside and in dialogue
with other cultural approaches to thinking about and
regulating warfare (e.g., as found in Islamic political
thought or Hinduism). This approach already has pro-
duced an impressive body of scholarship (Johnson and
Kelsay 1991; Nardin 1996; Sorabji and Rodin 2006;
3 There is no need to name names here; most of us who
write about the history of the just war tradition are
culpable on this count. Honorable exceptions include
Cox (2014); Bachofen (2015); Pugliatti (2010); Brunstetter
(2010); Orend (2000); Syse (2010); and Reichberg, Syse,
and Begby (2006).
Popovski, Reichberg, and Turner 2009; Hensel 2010;
Reichberg, Syse, and Hartwell 2014).
As developed here, however, the recovery of historical
imagination assumes a related but subtly different form.
It too is comparative, but it pursues a diachronic rather
synchronic approach. Instead of peering over the bound-
aries of the just war tradition to evaluate its counterparts
in other cultures and parts of the world, the idea pro-
posed here is to delve both further and more extensively
into the past than has hitherto been the case to examine
how just war has been understood in earlier historical
societies.4
To showcase this approach, this article examines a
set of texts from one remote historical society, namely
classical Greece. Within this frame, its principal focus
is upon the writings of Xenophon of Athens (431–356
BCE), a figure of some historical significance who is sel-
dom considered in relation to the tradition of just war
reasoning, but whose writings have the potential to illu-
minate some of its core aspects. The discussion will pro-
ceed by examining how Xenophon posits warfare in his
collected works, and in particular how he examines it in
terms of right and wrong. While the primary purpose is
not to argue for Xenophon’s inclusion in the tradition,
it will be shown that he treats the ethics of war in terms
that evoke the jus ad bellum and jus in bello categories
and principles that form the conceptual vocabulary of
contemporary just war thinking.5 Perhaps more impor-
tantly, this article will also show that the manner in which
4 This argument draws upon Schorske’s idea of “thinking
with history” (1998, 3), as well as the work Lowenthal
(1985) and others. For a recent example of what this
might look like, see Cox (2017).
5 There is a temptation here to cavil that this termi-
nology has no place in any discussion of Xenophon’s
writings—that this would be anachronistic. This com-
plaint has merit. There are, however, two responses
to it. First, it overlooks the degree to which any ex-
tension of this terminology, coined only in the twenti-
eth century (Kolb 1997), to classical just war thought is
anachronistic. Second, while scholars must be mind-
ful to treat historical categories of thought sensitively
and with due appreciation for their contextual charac-
ter, some element of translation may be necessary to
render those ideas intelligible to a contemporary audi-
ence (Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner 1984, 6–7). To this
end, it can be useful to treat certain “low-level plati-
tudes” as “bridgehead” concepts that make conversa-
tions possible across different societies and eras (Rorty,
Scheewind, and Skinner 1984, 2; also Lloyd 2004, 8). This
article uses just war categories in this way.
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Xenophon conceives of and deploys these terms casts a
revealing light upon how they are understood and em-
ployed today.6
In this regard, four points of interest come to the
fore that pertain, respectively, to the following: how war
is understood, its jus ad bellum dimensions, its jus in
bello practices, and the relation between them. In the
first instance, it will be argued that the view of warfare
advanced by Xenophon raises a host of questions per-
taining to how the “war” in “just war” is understood
today. For example, are contemporary articulations of
the just war ideal premised upon an agonal conception
of warfare that is out of date? And, how should victory
in contemporary armed conflict be conceived? Second,
it will be shown that the account of authority proffered
by Xenophon offers a richer alternative to contemporary
variants. While contemporary understandings of the au-
thority to wage war relate almost exclusively to the initial
decision to commence war, Xenophon presents an alter-
native view, wherein the authority to wage war is some-
thing that must be continually renewed throughout the
entire course of a conflict. Third, while much of contem-
porary just war thought focuses on which category of
person or group should be granted immunity in times of
conflict, Xenophon’s historical writings remind us of an-
other potentially very effective approach for limiting vio-
lence, namely, the practice of sanctuary. Fourth, it will be
proposed that Xenophon’s writings reveal that the dual
ends of just war thought, the pursuit of justice and the
preservation of order, need not be viewed, following the
contemporary orthodoxy, as antithetical to one another,
but instead as flip sides of the same coin.
Setting these points aside for the moment, this essay
will have been a success if it persuades scholars who are
inclined to take the just war tradition seriously to con-
sider the limiting effects of how it is typically delimited.
To borrow Tosh’s (2008, 28–29) memorable phrase, the
hope is that scholars will thus be moved to remember
that the history of the tradition is not a dead weight to
be borne, but an “intimation of possibilities.”
A Just War Thinker Avant la Lettre?
The son of a prosperous family, Xenophon’s childhood
in Athens coincided with the outbreak of the Pelopon-
nesian War. Like many of his peers, he was influenced
not only by the Homeric epics but also by the teachings
6 To borrow the language of critical security studies, this
aspect of the argument extends and deepens the claims
developed by O’Driscoll (2015) in respect of classical
Greek just war thought.
of Socrates, with whom he was personally acquainted
(Anderson 2001, 28). The latter’s execution in 399 BCE
was a formative moment in Xenophon’s life, souring his
relationship with Athenian democracy. He left the city
in 401 BCE to join a mercenary force, the Ten Thou-
sand, which Cyrus had commissioned (under spurious
pretenses) to overthrow his own brother, the King of
Persia, Artaxerxes. When the mission failed, Xenophon
played a key role in leading the army’s survivors on a
grueling march through dangerous lands back to Greece.
He marked his return by taking up a commission in the
Spartan army, for which he later took up arms against
his native Athens at Coronea, 394 BCE. He retired
twelve years later to Scillus, where he devoted himself
to literary pursuits. These included the Hellenica (Hell.),
which extended Thucydides’s history of the Pelopon-
nesian War beyond the end of that conflict to 362 BCE;
the Anabasis (Anab.), a chronicle of the Ten Thousand’s
(mis)adventures; the Cyropaedia (Cyr.), an encomium to
Cyrus the Great; and various other treatises and Socratic
dialogues.7 Xenophon died in 356 BCE, but not before
witnessing Sparta’s crushing defeat at Leuctra in 371 BCE
and suffering the death of his son, Gryllus, at the Battle
of Mantinea in 362 BCE.
Contemporary scholars have debated the merit of
these writings. Some, such as Anderson (2001, 2), scorn
them as the work of a second-rate mind. Others, such as
Higgins (1977, 1–7) andNadon (2001, 1–2), have begged
to differ. Higgins and Nadon present Xenophon as a se-
rious literary figure whose contribution to the tradition
of Western political thought has not been sufficiently ap-
preciated bymodern scholars. This neglect stands in stark
contrast to the admiration Xenophon’s works inspired in
previous eras. Xenophon was “among the most widely
read authors” in the Greco-Roman world, and figures
such as Polybius, Arrian of Nicomedia, Tacitus, Diony-
sius of Halicarnassus, Quintilian, and Aulus Gellius saw
fit to heap praise upon him (Nadon 2001, 4; Anderson
2001, 3). The clarity of his composition and the stoutly
7 This article uses standard abbreviations to cite texts by
Xenophon: Hellenica (1979); Anabasis (1972); Cyropae-
dia (2001); Poroi (1997d); Hipparchicus (1997c); and
Agesilaus (1997b);Hiero (1997a). All texts are cited in En-
glish translation, and references are to book and chap-
ter numbers, not page numbers. Other texts cited in this
manner include: Euripides’ Heracless (2002); Aeschy-
lus’ Persians (2009); Cicero’s Selected Letters (1986);
Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War (2013);
and Plato’s Laws (2005). In-text citation is also used for
Hugo 2005 The Rights of War and Peace and Emmer de
2008 The Law of Nations.
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conventional moral values his stories imparted ensured
that texts such as the Anabasis would be a staple text
for Roman schoolchildren. Xenophon’s prominence en-
dured to the Enlightenment period, when Montesquieu
and Rousseau, among others, paid tribute to him (Nadon
2001, 2–3). Interestingly, there has also been a recent
surge in interest in Xenophon’s writings from political-
science and international-relations scholars. Since 2015,
three articles on Xenophon have appeared in one jour-
nal alone, namely the American Political Science Review
(Bartlett 2015; Fallis 2015; Smith-Pangle 2017).
Xenophon’s writings were also influential for a num-
ber of figures associated with the just war tradition. In
first century BCE, Marcus Tullius Cicero acknowledged
a profound intellectual debt to Xenophon. As a young
man, Cicero learned Greek by translating Xenophon’s
Oeconomicus, and he later remarked in a series of letters
(Ep. 27; Ep. 50) that he sought in his own life to emu-
late the wisdom and example of Xenophon’s arguably
finest literary character, Cyrus the Great (Wiedemann
1994, 21). In the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius
made extensive use of Xenophon’s writings as support-
ing material for arguments he advanced in The Rights
of War and Peace. He cited Xenophon across all three
books of the aforementioned text, on a range of topics
including the importance of avoiding war where possi-
ble (II.XXIV.II.4); the legality of warfare (I.II.I.3); what
counts as a just cause for the use of force (II.I.V.1); the
virtue of restraint in battle (III.XI.XIII.1); and the need
to keep faith with the enemy (III.VIII.II.2). The Swiss ju-
rist, Emer de Vattel, did likewise in his 1758 classic, The
Law of Nations (I.XI.§112; III.VI.§141; III.VIII.§147;
III.VIII.§158; and III.X.§180). These authors aside, one
might judge Xenophon’s reception in the later just war
literature as patchy at best. This is in keeping with how
Roman sources dominated earlier Greek ones in the evo-
lution of medieval just war reasoning.
Two potential difficulties arise at this point. First, how
should we interpret what Xenophon had to say about
the ethics of war? And second, how should we relate
these views of his to the just war tradition? A few words
on each of these issues will pave the way for the dis-
cussion that follows. The first question pertains to how
we make sense of Xenophon’s complex and multilay-
ered texts. While Xenophon detailed the norms that gov-
erned Greek warfare, it is hard to know if he was sim-
ply recording them or also endorsing them. Furthermore,
where Xenophon is concerned, the line between descrip-
tion and prescription is often in the eye of the beholder.
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that Xenophon
variously projected his authorial voice onto different pro-
tagonists, wrote of his own role in historical events in the
third person, published under a nom de plume (Hell.),
and blurred the lines between fact and fiction (Cyr.). Fur-
thermore, contradictions abound in his writings on war.
These factors combine to make it difficult to arrive at an
authoritative reading of Xenophon’s views on the ethics
of war. Rather, the best one can hope for is a catalog of
the various principles and norms that Xenophon’s writ-
ings suggest were in force in his day. While this will not
reveal very much about what motivated Xenophon, nor
help us distinguish his ironic claims from his sincere ones,
it will afford us a certain amount of insight into the tem-
per of the times and the boundaries of the moral universe
that Xenophon inhabited.
This still leaves the question of the connection be-
tween Xenophon’s ethics of war and the just war tradi-
tion.Most of what Xenophon had to say about the ethics
of war was ancillary to his focus on political leadership,
education, and virtue. Even if one argues that whatever
Xenophon did have to say about the ethics of war evokes
familiar just war principles such as just cause or proper
authority, he would not have been familiar with that
particular vocabulary or aware of the schematic form
it would later develop. Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that Xenophon did not perceive himself to be engaging
with or contributing to the just war tradition. Insofar as
one ought to be mindful of the injunction to treat his-
torical thinkers in their own terms, and not to interpret
their claims in light of categories of thought that were
not available to them, this matters a great deal (Skinner
2002, 61). Yet, even though Xenophon did not conceive
of his endeavors in this light, I hope to demonstrate that
it is possible to identify a homologous relation between
his views on the rights and wrongs of war and what we
earlier called the moral categories and principles of just
war thinking.8
Xenophon’s War
While the temptation exists to plunge straight into what
Xenophon and his contemporaries held to be “justified”
with respect to war, one must not neglect to first exam-
ine how he posits “war” itself. Following a line of inquiry
suggested by Clark (2015, 2, 6–7, 17–19), this sectionwill
expose the ethical commitments and assumptions that in-
form Xenophon’s conception of war and, by extension,
his understanding of just war. Beyond telling us some-
thing interesting, if not essential, about Xenophon’s views
on the ethics of war, this discussion will underline the
importance of thinking critically (which in this case also
means historically) about the different ways in which war
8 See footnote 5 for further justification of this approach.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article-abstract/3/2/234/4964797
by University of Glasgow user
on 07 June 2018
238 Just War and Historical Imagination
has been understood over time and the political effects of
this.9
There has been heated debate in recent years about
what constitutes warfare, and even whether it still ex-
ists (Clark 2015, 2–4; Smith 2005, 3; Gow 2013, 2–3;
Kahn 2013). The catalyst for this debate is the increased
use by the United States and other advanced militaries
of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), more com-
monly known as drones. The introduction of this tech-
nology has, it is argued, introduced a radically different
form of combat from anything else that preceded it. This
novelty stems from the fact that drones facilitate a radical
asymmetry wherein members of the advanced army can
now kill without risk of being killed. As Enemark (2014,
4) asks, “if drones cross a line between a mode of killing
that entails reduced risk to the killer and amode of killing
that is risk-free, it is worth asking whether war is go-
ing on at all (italics added).” Needless to say, Xenophon
never encountered this particular problem. The questions
raised by the advent of drones are helpful, however, in-
sofar as they bring into sharp relief certain aspects of
Xenophon’s conception of warfare (that may otherwise
slip by unnoticed).
War, as described by Xenophon, was agonal in char-
acter. That is to say, he depicted it as akin to a game or
tournament, bounded by set rules and rituals.10 Pitched
battles played a central role. Battles were typically ini-
tiated by a deliberate act of provocation, whereby one
army would march through the territory of its foe, set-
ting fire to habitations and razing crops (Ages. I.33;Hell.
I.1.33–34; I.2.2; V.2.4). If the challengewas accepted, for-
mal hostilities would commence. Following preliminary
skirmishes involving squads of lightly armed soldiers, the
opposing ranks of hoplite infantry would either march
or run across the open field to join battle with their op-
ponents (Hell. III.2.15–17; V.2.41–42). On the occasions
that Xenophon described actual combat, he depicted it
as a melee of shoving, stabbing, slashing, and grappling
(Ages. II.9–17; Hell. IV.3.16–21). Battles were almost al-
ways brief, intense affairs, seldom lastingmore than a day
(Hell. V.4.45). A battle was won when an army broke
its enemy’s lines, causing it to flee from the battlefield
(Hell. I.2.9–11; II.4.5–7;Anab.VI.5)—though there were
9 On the connection between thinking critically and think-
ing historically, see Devetak (2014).
10 Several primary sources support the agonal thesis, but
it likely reflects an idealized account of Greek warfare,
rather than its actuality. Nevertheless, what is of inter-
est here is that it structures Xenophon’s account of war-
fare. For an excellent primer on Greek warfare, se van
Wees (2004). Part IV treats agonal warfare in depth.
occasions when battles concluded almost before they be-
gan, on account of one side fleeing before any blood
was spilled (Anab. I.8;Hell.VII.1.31–32).Whichever side
drove the other from the field of battle earned the right to
mount a trophy, a ritual that was tantamount to a procla-
mation of victory, and which thereby confirmed the con-
clusion of the conflict and the dispute that occasioned it
(e.g.,Hell. IV.6.12).
The erection of the trophy signaled the opportunity
for the heralds on the losing side to approach the vic-
torious army to arrange for the retrieval of its slain sol-
diers (Hell. III.5.22–24). This was of paramount impor-
tance. The proper burial of the dead was a “sacred duty”
in Xenophon’s Greece (Garlan 1975, 61; Vaughn 1993;
O’Driscoll 2015, 7). Any failure to discharge this obli-
gation occasioned bitter recriminations. Xenophon’s ac-
count of the trial and conviction of the Athenian gener-
als charged with responsibility for the failure to recover
their dead at the Battle of Arginusae (406 BCE) attests
to this (Hell. I.7). By the same token, Greek armies were
generally willing to facilitate a defeated enemy’s efforts
to bury its own dead. It was customary for the victors to
greet the heralds from the vanquished side politely and to
comply with their request for access to the battlefield to
gather their dead. Thucydides (IV.97) recorded only one
occasion upon which the victor denied the defeated side
leave to do so, and this was because the latter had violated
a sanctuary during the conflict. Xenophon cataloged no
such cases. He did, however, furnish evidence that de-
feated armies refrained from violating their conqueror’s
trophies (Hell. IV.5.10), and we know from Plutarch that
it was proscribed for the victors to repair their trophies
when they inevitably decayed (Pritchett 1974, 253). The
hope behind this was that once a trophy had decomposed
the memory of the hostilities that occasioned it would be
extinguished (Pritchett 1974).11
The sole occasion on which Greek armies were per-
mitted to construct permanent trophies was when the vic-
tory they had won was over a barbarian adversary (West
1969). This exception belied the fact that Xenophon
(and the Greeks more generally) perceived wars waged
between Greek states to be qualitatively different from
wars waged by Greek states against barbarian nations.
In Xenophon’s words, if “the proper course of action”
for a Greek city waging war against other Greek cities
“was to discipline them rather than enslave them” (Ages.
VII.6), the opposite applied when the adversary was a
11 The trophy of this period differs in meaning from mod-
ern war memorials. If the modern approach is charac-
terized by the injunction “never forget,” the trophy was
designed to ease forgetting (Borg 1991; Winter 1995).
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barbarian—restraints could be loosened, and war waged
in a no-holds-barred manner. The implications of this are
evident in Xenophon’s account of how an ambassadorial
delegation lauded the Ten Thousand for their conquest
of barbarian territories, while at the same time admon-
ishing them for attacking Greek lands (Anab. V.5). Be-
yond this, Xenophon recorded several incidents wherein
Greek armies treated other Greek armies with a level of
respect that they would not have offered barbarian foes
(e.g., Hell. I.6.14; III.2.22).12 While this way of framing
may sound retrograde, it draws our attention to two is-
sues: first, the challenge that arises when attempting to
limit wars waged between and across different cultural or
civilizational groupings, and second, the degree to which
different ethical approaches to war are predicated upon
how war itself is defined. Neither of these issues receive
sufficient attention today.13
Setting the category of wars against barbarians to one
side, the protocols surrounding the trophy underline the
agonal character of warfare in Xenophon’s texts. The
practice of warfare appears as a formal affair focused on
the crucible of pitched battle and bounded by an insti-
tutionalized means of distinguishing the winner and the
loser in any given conflict. The advent of drone warfare
(alongside other new military technologies and practices)
suggests that the salience of this model for understand-
ing contemporary armed conflict is severely limited—a
point that military historians have been making for at
least a quarter of a century (Weigley 1991). And yet, as
the responses to the emergence of drone warfare attest
(see above), agonal understandings of warfare still per-
vade contemporary just war thinking.
Jus ad Bellum
How did Xenophon address the question of justice to
the practice of warfare? To begin with, it is important
to note that the Greeks did not conceive of justice in
the same manner as we do today. For them, it was not
an abstract noun, but rather something that people did.
Where we are inclined to ask what justice means, the
Greeks were more likely to ask what it means to act
justly (Oakeshott 2006, 82).14 The answer they arrived
12 This way of framing evokes Plato’s distinction between
“civil strife” and “war” (Rep. §469-71 (Plato 1974)). Civil
strife pitted Greek societies against one another and
was properly conducted “in a spirit of correction, not
of enmity.”War, however, fought by Greeks against bar-
barians, was a no-holds-barred affair.
13 One notable exception to this is Linklater (2017).
14 For a more detailed account of the Greek understanding
of justice, see Havelock (1978).
at was that acting justly involved paying one’s dues,
which parlayed into doing good for one’s friends and
harm to one’s enemies. As Xenophon put it, “a man’s
excellence consists in outdoing his friends in kindness
and his enemies in mischief” (Mem. II.6.35).15 What did
this mean with respect to warfare? Xenophon stated a
preference for peace over war and advocated “a policy of
not initiating unjust wars against others (Por. V.13).”16
This was not a blanket ban on the recourse to force:
it permitted states to wage what would be called “just
wars” if certain conditions were met.
The first of these conditions is that the state in ques-
tion must possess a just cause.Xenophon cited the receipt
of an unprovoked attack as an example of what consti-
tutes a just cause (Por. V.13). Beyond this, his historical
writings suggest that Greek states habitually sought to
justify their wars as a response to the infliction of an un-
just injury on either their own societies or their allies (e.g.,
Hell. III.5.6–15; VI.5.36–41). His account of the Spar-
tans’ attempts to persuade the Athenians of the legiti-
macy of their war against Thebes is a case in point. “The
Thebans have come into our country, have cut down our
trees, burned our houses, and stolen our property and our
cattle,” the Spartans complained. “Surely, then, you must
be violating your oaths if you fail to come to our assis-
tance, when we are so clearly the victim of aggression”
(Hell. VI.5.37). This was not the case for war sui generis
either. Xenophon attributed a similar argument to Cyrus
in the Cyropaedia, a hagiography to the King of Kings:
“Let us go forth with confidence . . . for now enemies are
coming, beginning the unjust deeds, and our friends sum-
mon us to be auxiliaries. What is more just than defend-
ing ourselves or more noble than aiding friends?” (Cyr.
I.5.13). Xenophon also recorded states seeking to jus-
tify wars based on the need to forestall emergent threats
(Hell. IV.2.10–13; V.2.18; VI.38–41), to vindicate a vio-
lated oath (Anab. III.2; Hell. VI.5.12), and even to en-
force what we today might call a right to hospitality
(Anab. V.5). While this appears an unusually wide range
of prospective just causes for war, each and every one
of them recur at some point or other in later just war
thought, suggesting a certain degree of continuity with
the main line of the tradition.17
Just cause by itself was not, however, sufficient to
legitimate the recourse to war. Xenophon’s historical
15 This is the conventional view of justice set out by Plato
in Book I of The Republic (§1 and 2). For analysis, see
Dover (1974, 180–81).
16 “Wise men do not go to war for trifling things,” he wrote
in the Hellenica (VI.3.4-6).
17 On the historical evolution of just cause in justwar think-
ing, see Johnson (1999, 28–30).
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writings suggest that the state in question also had to
possess the requisite authority to initiate hostilities. He
described an elaborate complex of rituals governing the
authorization of war between Greek states. Prior to the
commencement of war, community leaders working in
tandem with religious officials were expected to obtain
divine approval for the use of force. This entailed con-
sulting oracles, conducting divinatory sacrifices, and ob-
serving omens. Xenophon’s writings are littered with ref-
erences to these practices (e.g., Cyr. II.1.1; Hell. IV.7.7;
Anab. III.1). Once the officials were satisfied that the aus-
pices were positive, they, and they alone, were entitled to
levy war on behalf of the state (see Hell. II.2.18; V.4.20–
24). The final step was to depute the formal proclamation
of war to a herald, a quasi-religious personage and state
functionary whose involvement signified both the war’s
official and divine character (Cyr. V.4.24–27; Anab. II.1;
II.3; Hell. II.4.22).
While there is an inclination to ask whether the gods
were the ultimate locus of authority or merely consulted
on an advisory basis by state officials, this questionmisses
the degree to which the profane and the secular were
fused in classical Greece. If, as Sourvinou-Inwood (1990)
has remarked, the authority of the polis both articulated
and was articulated by religion, the polis “anchored,
legitimated, and mediated all religious activity.” This
makes for a marked contrast to what Ullmann (1965,
12–13) characterized as the later Western tendency to
identify the origin of political authority with either a
divine or natural source, never an admixture of both.
Ullmann’s argument regarding ascending and descend-
ing theories of government and law has latterly become
the subject of dispute. Contemporary historians of me-
dieval political thought dismiss it as overdrawn and out
of date.18 Regardless of its intuitive appeal, then, schol-
ars should guard against assuming that this way of view-
ing the source of political authority can be extended to
classical Greek thought. Xenophon’s writings on the au-
thorization of warfare attest that the reality was more
complex than this would allow.
Interestingly, the requirement of proper authority was
not confined to the initiation of warfare. Once obtained,
it had to be continually renewed. To this end, belliger-
ent armies conducted sacrifices not just prior to war, but
through its duration.Xenophon reported that armies car-
ried out these rituals every day at dawn (Anab. IV.6),
prior to all battles (Hell. III.2.17), attendant to river and
border crossings (Hell. 4.3–4), or simply whenever di-
vine guidance was desired (Hell. III.2.24–26). The Greeks
18 Many thanks to Rory Cox for bringing this point to my
attention.
placed great faith in these rituals, and plans could be
postponed (Anab. VI.4), altered (Hell. III.4.15), or can-
celed (Hell. IV.7.7; Anab. V.5), depending on their result.
Xenophon also cited several occasions when comman-
ders imperiled the lives of their men by repeating sac-
rifices under enemy fire until they obtained a felicitous
result (Hell. III.1.17–18; Anab. VI.4).
This way of approaching matters stands in contrast
to the contemporary legal norms that govern the use
of force in international society, which focus almost ex-
clusively on the initial recourse to war. On this model,
belligerents are obliged to procure authorization for the
initiation of hostilities but not for their continuation. Ac-
cordingly, there is no expectation that belligerents should
regularly or as a matter of course renew their authority to
wage war.19 The limitations of this approach are visible
in respect of the legal justification offered for the 2003
invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies. While
the debate surrounding the legitimacy of the intervention
focused on the (non)existence of weapons of mass de-
struction and Saddam Hussein’s record of mass human
rights abuses, the legal basis for the war claimed by the
US and UK governments rested on United Nations Secu-
rity Council Resolution 678, passed twelve years earlier
in the context of the 1991 Gulf War (Taft and Buchwald
2003). Resolution 678 authorized states to use “all nec-
essary means” to eject Iraq from Kuwait. Subsequently,
Resolution 687, which brought an end to the Gulf War,
prescribed that any failure on Iraq’s part to comply with
its terms would trigger the resumption of conflict on the
grounds previously specified in Resolution 678. Twelve
years later, in 2003, Resolution 1441 cited this mech-
anism as the legal basis for invading Iraq. The general
point here, however, is merely to demonstrate how the
practices described by Xenophon bring into stark relief
the thin and heavily front-loaded character of the con-
temporary approach to proper authority.
Moving on, evidence for something approximating
right intention is patchier in Xenophon’s writings, but
still discernible. He praised the Spartan king, Agesilaus,
for his commitment to waging war with the purpose of
justice inmind, as he did against Olynthus: “The object of
this expedition is not to do harm but to do good to those
19 The shift toward targeted killing as a means of waging
war has the potential to alter this norm. According to
Crawford (2013), the requirement that every drone strike
must be approved on its own terms creates the condi-
tions for treating the authority towagewar, not as some-
thing that is granted once, but as something thatmust be
continually renewed. Thanks to Rory Cox for drawingmy
attention to this.
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who have been harmed” (Hell.V.3.14).War, on this view,
may be justified if it is intended to counter acts of harm.20
There is also evidence that Xenophon acknowledged an
interior dimension with respect to right intention. His ac-
count of the Argives’s attempt to invoke a holy truce to
forestall an impending Spartan attack offers the clearest
example of this (Hell. IV.7.2). Xenophon reported that
Agesilaus sought guidance from the oracle at Olympia
on the validity of the Argive claim. “[Agesilaus] pointed
out that [the Argives] had begun to talk about the holy
months not at the correct times but only when the Spar-
tans were on the point of invading their country.” The
oracle’s response was blunt: “[t]he god signified to [Age-
silaus] that it was in accordance with his religious duties
not to accept a truce which had been offered in a dishon-
est manner.”
Xenophon also anticipated what would later be la-
beled the principles of “last resort” and “reasonable
chance of success.” We should “be as slow as we can to
start a war and as quick as we can to end it,” he wrote
in the Hellenica (VI.3.4–6). Elsewhere, he was emphatic
that a community should never initiate war unless it had
a strong “chance of winning” (Anab. VII.1). He does not
elaborate these ideas, but it is interesting that he refer-
ences them at all, for they would not be codified, as it
were, until much later.
Jus in Bello
If a state should be slow to start a war, what, if any, re-
strictions did Xenophon attach to its conduct? Xenophon
acknowledged a number of restraints bearing on Greek
warfare. Again, they may be most usefully explicated by
reference to contemporary jus in bello precepts.
The most notable restraints detailed by Xenophon ap-
proximate to what contemporary theorists call the prin-
ciple of discrimination.21 Xenophon’s writings indicate
that discrimination functioned to protect officials and
dignitaries from the ravages of war. Certain categories of
persons, most notably heralds and envoys, were granted
immunity from hostilities (Anab. V.7). This commonly
took the form of a guarantee of “safe conduct,” and its
protection extended to all members of the subject’s trav-
eling party and could also include provision for hospi-
tality (Anab. II.3). Beyond diplomatic personages, there
are also a series of passages in both the Cyropaedia and
the Agesilaus that suggest that immunity might in certain
20 If one squints onemight discern in this statement a fore-
shadowing of the later idea that war is just in an ad bel-
lum sense only if it causes more good than harm.
21 On discrimination, see Kinsella (2011).
circumstances be extended to all persons not directly in-
volved in the activity of fighting.Xenophon recorded that
the titular heroes of both texts commanded their men
to withhold from undertaking any attacks on the civil-
ian populations of the lands they were traversing. Thus,
Cyrus variously bade his men to “kill all those in arms”
but spare everyone else (Cyr. V.3.1) and to ensure that
“there be peace for those working, but war for those
in arms” (Cyr. V.4.27; II.4.32; VII.5.31; Hell. VI.5.12;
Anab. III.2). It is, however, very much the case that the
focus of discrimination was on protecting diplomatic of-
ficials and not the more general category of noncombat-
ants.
Discrimination did not only apply to persons, how-
ever. Xenophon noted that it could also be extended to
times and places. With respect to the former, and similar
to the medieval “Truce of God” movement, Xenophon
details that the Greeks proscribed military operations
during periods of truce and religious festivals (Hell.
IV.4.2). This meant that all communities were obliged to
refrain from warfare during negotiated truces and for the
duration of the great PanHellenic games and that individ-
ual communities were expected to refrain from all mar-
tial activities during their own festive periods.22 As noted
above, communities occasionally accused one another of
cynically appealing to periods of truce to shirk involve-
ment in certain wars, but far from undermining the norm,
this only underlines its strength.
Xenophon also designated particular sites of cultural
and religious significance, such as the Temple of Artemis
(Hell.VI.5.9), as sanctuaries, which means they too were
spared the ravages of warfare. The Greeks designated
these spaces inviolable, and it was forbidden to profane
them by conducting hostilities against anyone or any-
thing within its boundaries (Sinn 2008, 158; Pedley 2006,
29). As Xenophon put it, to violate a sanctuary is to show
“contempt for religion and a total disregard for the con-
ventions of civilized life” (Hell. IV.4.2–4). Accordingly, to
trespass upon a sanctuary was not just to transgress the
laws of man, it was to offend the gods in whose name that
site had been rendered inviolable. The cloak of protection
provided by sanctuary extended to all who sought refuge
within its boundaries, even enemy soldiers. Proof of this is
Xenophon’s account of Agesilaus’s response to the news
that eighty of his enemies who had recently fled from him
22 The custom of refraining from hostilities during times
of celebration was the explanation for the Spartans’
failure to make a timely appearance at the battle of
Marathon 480 BCE. The Spartans declined to march on
the Persians until the next full moon signaled the con-
clusion of the holy festival ofCarneia (Holland 2005, 188).
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on the battlefield were now hiding out in a temple. “In
spite of the many wounds he had received,” Xenophon
wrote (Hell. IV.3.20), “he still remembered what was due
to heaven. He told [his troops] to let the men go wher-
ever they wished and would not allow them to do any-
thing wrong.”Elsewhere, Xenophon praised Agesilaus as
“a scrupulous observer of sacred places . . . (who) never
did violence to anyone, even to an enemy, who had taken
refuge in the sanctuary of a god” (Ages. X.1).
Judging on the available evidence, the mechanism of
sanctuary appears to have been an effective means of lim-
iting the destructiveness of warfare. Yet, while the con-
cept of sanctuary has never entirely disappeared from
view, it features only peripherally in contemporary just
war discourse. This holds true despite the fact that crimes
such as the recent ransacking of Palmyra by the so-called
Islamic State have precipitated calls for a renewed focus
on the protections afforded to religious and cultural sites
(Peterson 2016; more broadly,Hassner 2009).Onemight
reasonably ask, why is this? How has this neglect of the
idea of sanctuary come to pass?23 And, would it be pos-
sible to (re)connect the practice of offering sanctuary to
the more prominent norm of discrimination and promote
its revival as a primary form of restraint in war? One’s
immediate response might be to suggest that the prac-
tice of sanctuary has little utility in the context of today’s
amorphous battlespaces. How, one might ask, might the
demarcation of a particular patch of territory as invio-
lable serve a meaningful purpose in a world in which
war has arguably been deterritorialized? Yet, the pro-
tection that the sanctuary city movement has been able
to offer asylum seekers in countries such as the United
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom indicates that
the practice of sanctuary can also be recast in nonspatial
terms (Bagelman 2015). Such initiatives could serve as a
source of inspiration for thinking about how the practice
of sanctuary might be revived with respect to warfare.
Aside from discrimination, what other principles of
conduct did Xenophon attach to the waging of war?
If one was enjoined to do good for one’s friends and
leave those who played no part in war well enough
alone, sworn enemies were to be treated with severity.
Accordingly, Xenophon wrote acceptingly of harsh mea-
sures meted out to foes. For instance, in contrast to
other Greek sources (Plato Laws 706c; Aeschylus Pers.),
Xenophon passed no judgment on the use of the bow
and arrow against enemy troops, nor did he censure the
use of guerrilla tactics (e.g.,Hell. III.2.4; IV.5.13–18)—a
23 The ignominious failure of “safe havens” in the Bosnian
War and elsewhere has surely played some role in this,
but is presumably not the full explanation.
tactic his contemporaries disparaged as beyond the pale
(e.g., Euripides Her. 145–80). He also declined to con-
demn the use of sneak attacks (Hell. IV.4.15), blockades
(Hell. III.2.1; V.3.23),water-tampering (Hell. III.1.7), and
strategies designed to “strike terror” into enemy societies
(Anab.VII.4). Instead, he viewed such acts simply as part
and parcel of the requirement to do one’s worst against
sworn enemies.24
This injunction also extended to the practice of trick-
ery, a thorny topic for men brought up to revere prowess
in battle above all else (O’Driscoll 2015, 5). Xenophon
acknowledged the opprobrium that guile can attract
when he quoted a heated argument between the young
Cyrus and his father, Cambyses, on the topic of prac-
ticing trickery in war. As related by Xenophon, the ex-
change began when Cyrus rebuked his father for counsel-
ing him to learn the art of subterfuge: “Father, what sort
of man you say I must become!” (Cyr. I.6.27–34). Cam-
byses’s patient response to the future king is revealing.
It is true, he tells his son (I.6.27–34), that while friends
should refrain from practicing trickery against one an-
other, no such courtesies apply when one is waging war
against enemies. Instead, it is incumbent on the military
man to become a “poet of stratagems against the enemy.”
Xenophon clarified this counsel in the Agesilaus (I.17)
where he noted that, while deceiving one’s friends is the
act of a scoundrel, tricking one’s enemies is not only the
act of a good soldier, it is also “just and fair” (also,Hell.
III.1.8; IV.4.10; Hip. V.8–11). This conflicts with later
just war thought, which draws a pronounced distinction
between trickery and perfidy, with the former permitted
and the latter prohibited (Whetham 2009).
The allowance of trickery against wartime enemies
but not against peacetime rivals is also at odds with the
“reductivist” strand of contemporary revisionist just war
thought, which holds that the same principles of conduct
that pertain in peacetime should also apply in wartime.25
Where reductivists contend that a soldier’s license to use
24 The easiest way to understand this is by reference to
the line made famous by the character Omar in the HBO
television series, The Wire: “It’s all in the game.”
25 Reductivists “reduce the morality of war to the moral-
ity of life outside of war; reductivists think that people
lose the protection of their right to life on just the same
grounds in war as they do outside of war, and they think
that the lesser evil justifications that apply in war are no
different from those that apply outside it. This amounts
to a clear stance on how to think about the morality
of war: start by working out the principles that govern
liability and lesser evil justifications in life outside of
war, then apply those principles to war” (Lazar 2017).
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force remains the same regardless of whether they are
confronting an enemy soldier in battle or an armed bank
robber, Xenophon’s approach is different. It supposes
that the act of declaring war and formally designating
one’s rival as an enemy generates a new set of relations
with that person or group. This insight was refined by
Cicero who argued that the rules that govern any given
conflict are determined not only by the kind of war be-
ing fought—a war for survival, or a war for empire—but
also by whether the adversary was a formal enemy or
an outlaw (De Off. I.38; III.107 (Cicero, 1991)). While
the approach favored by Xenophon (and later Cicero) is
subject to precisely the traits that reductivists repudiate,
it also draws our attention to the rich moral vocabulary
pertaining to enmity that their position necessarily, but
perhaps regrettably, occludes.
Just War as an Ordering Activity
At this point, the discussion takes a turn. This turn per-
tains to the relation between justice and order Xenophon
intimates in his writings onwar and,more specifically, the
counterpoint it offers to contemporary just war theoriz-
ing. In order to appreciate the former, it will be helpful to
first say a few words about the latter.
Rengger’s (2013) excellent monograph, Just War and
International Order: The Uncivil Condition in World
Politics, provides our point of departure. Rengger’s pur-
pose in this book is to chart (and denounce) what he
takes to be the “foolish and harmful” trajectory that has
been evident within just war theorizing since the late eigh-
teenth century and which subsequently (since the twen-
tieth century) acquired a vicelike grip upon it (Rengger
2013, ix). This trajectory, which Rengger describes in
terms borrowed from Oakeshott (2006), consists of a
mounting tendency to connect the idea and practice of
just war to what is essentially a liberal internationalist
account of justice.26 The effect of this is to yoke just war
thinking to an interventionist ethic, which assumes the
use of force to be a vector for good in the world, a means
of spreading human rights and democracy to otherwise
troubled regions. Though fascinating, Rengger’s account
of how this development came to pass need not detain us
here; of more interest are the consequences he sees it pro-
ducing. He argues that where the just war tradition his-
torically reflected a concern for both the advancement of
justice and the limitation of war, contemporary just war
thinking tends to view these as competing goals, with the
26 This account of Rengger’s argument follows G. John
Ikenberry’s description of it in his capsule review for
Foreign Affairs 93:1 (2014).
former given priority over the latter. As he puts it, when it
comes to modern just war thinking, “a conception of the
ethics of force as predominantly about the pursuit of jus-
tice, or perhaps better, the elimination of injustice, rather
than about the restraint of force” has risen to the fore
(Rengger 2013, 9).
The key point here is that Rengger detects in recent
just war theorizing the emergence of a tension between
what were traditionally tandem themes of just war think-
ing. As he explains it, proponents of the just war ap-
proach have, over the past two centuries, come to view
the tradition “as essentially about the punishment of
wrongdoing rather than (as opposed to alongside) the
limitation of destructiveness” (Rengger 2013, 9).What is
most striking here is not so much Rengger’s claim that the
pursuit of justice has priority over the limitation of war
in contemporary just war scholarship, as his subtle obser-
vation that they are treated as competing ends, such that
it is possible to quest after one or the other at any given
time, but not both. Just war thinking, on this account,
is an either/or business: one must privilege either the pur-
suit of justice or the limitation of war, because one cannot
achieve both at the same time.27 When all is brought to-
gether, then,Rengger’s argument is that the pursuit of jus-
tice and the limitation of war appear as competing ends
in modern just war theorizing, that the former is increas-
ingly cast in the terms set by liberal internationalism, and
that, thus construed, it is granted priority by just war the-
orists over the limitation of war. Although this argument
might, at first glance, appear to be purely esoteric in char-
acter, this is very much not the case. As Rengger explains,
the factors just listed combine to create a more permis-
sive attitude toward force, leading to more rather than
less war in the world.28
27 Interestingly, this problem might be seen as loosely
mapping ontowhat English School theorists have identi-
fied as one of the principal fissures in international soci-
ety, namely the tension between the imperatives of jus-
tice and order (Bull 2002, 74–94, 180–83).
28 To quote Rengger’s (2013, 158) epilogue, “[t]he main
argument of this book has been that the intertwining
of the teleocratic conception of the modern state and
the post-[sixteenth] century just war tradition has pro-
duced, in the modern reworking of the just war, a con-
ception of ‘legitimate force’ that, at least in principle,
is much more permissive than is usually supposed. It is
permissive to the extent that, rather than acting as a re-
straint on the use of force by states, or indeed by other
agents, it can act as a facilitator, or even driver, for such
use.”
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It is against this backdrop that the most interesting
aspect of Xenophon’s thinking on just war emerges. This
is that aspect of Xenophon’s thought, which, rather than
pitting the pursuit of justice against the limitation of war
as rival ends, posits them as interlocking goods, such
that it would be nigh impossible to achieve one with-
out the other. This is because the pursuit of justice is, for
Xenophon, essentially an ordering activity: it involves al-
locating goods and harms where they are due. This being
the case, it follows that the achievement of a good order,
wherein each actor’s entitlements and liabilities are ac-
counted for, is intrinsic to (as well as the culmination of)
the process of enacting justice (Higgins 1977, 28–30). Ac-
cordingly, humans should regulate their conduct so that
each seeks only his or her just desserts, no more nor less,
and afford others the same license. This creates an imper-
ative to act always in a regulated manner and to refrain
from all forms of hubristic or excessive behavior—even
(or perhaps especially) when one is acting in the pur-
suit of justice (for a related argument, see May 2012,
8–9). Like counterweights, then, the pursuit of justice and
the limitation of war can be perceived as working not
against but in tandemwith one another (Cyr. III.1.15–31;
III.2.12–14; IV.5.7–13). Viewed in this light, the limita-
tion of war is not in tension with the pursuit of justice,
but endogenous to it.
This way of approaching matters is, of course, predi-
cated upon a very different understanding of justice than
the one that prevails today.29 As such, and because one
can no more turn the clock back in time than jump in the
same river twice, it is not the case that one could resolve
the problems Rengger identifies by simply plugging this
way of thinking into contemporary just war theorizing.
Nonetheless, it is of great value insofar as it affords us a
new(-old) perspective on the limits of contemporary just
war theorizing and awakens us to the fact that it is possi-
ble to think about just war in terms that challenge rather
than affirm its contemporary framing.30
29 This has already been alluded to above; see footnote 14.
30 The hope behind revisiting prevailing conceptions of
just war is best summed up by C. S. Lewis: “Most of
all, perhaps, we need intimate knowledge of the past.
Not that the past has any magic about it, but because
we cannot study the future, and yet need something to
set against the present, to remind us that basic assump-
tions have been quite different in different periods and
that much which seems certain to the uneducated is
merely temporary fashion. A manwho has lived in many
places is not likely to be deceived by the errors of his
native village” (quoted in Kelsay 2010, 231).
Conclusion
Lest there be any misunderstanding, the purpose of this
article was not to press a claim for Xenophon’s induction
into the just war hall of fame. Rather, its purpose was to
demonstrate that a relatively mature set of reflections on
the relationship between justice and war can be extracted
from Xenophon’s writings and that the structure of these
reflections is not only homologous to but also cast new
light upon the categories of later just war thought.
Taking these claims in turn, the fact that one can trace
a degree of continuity between Xenophon’s ethics of war
and later just war reasoning is quite interesting in its own
right. The identification of an element continuity between
Xenophon’s ethics of war and just war reasoning under-
mines the all too common assumption that the roots of
the latter lie in early Christian political theology, and in
particular, in the writings of Augustine. Conversely, the
arguments put forward here establish that, not only did
classical Greek sources address ethical questions pertain-
ing to war, their attempts to engage these questions re-
flect a coherent (if not exactly systematic) approach.31 If
this article successfully conveys that just war reasoning
is much older than we might have hitherto believed, it
also informs us that classical Greek political thought and
practice is more rich and diverse than scholars might oth-
erwise have imagined. In particular, Xenophon’s writings
on war affirm that classical Greek political thought and
practice has much more to it than the kind of cynical re-
alism that contemporary scholars are wont to associate
with Thucydides.32
Turning to the second claim, because medieval and
early modern just war thinkers favored Roman over
Greek sources, Xenophon’s writings stand slightly aloof
from the mainline of the just war tradition, thereby fur-
nishing the prospect of a critical perspective upon it. Yet,
this paper has shown how Xenophon’s writings both il-
luminate the contingencies of range of core categories of
just war thought and suggest different ways of approach-
ing them. The focus in this respect was on four partic-
ular issues: the conception of “war” that “just war” is
predicated upon; the jus ad bellum principle of proper
31 The importance given to Xenophon in this article goes
beyond any other study of just war thinking in classical
Greek political thought and practice, including the fol-
lowing: O’Driscoll (2015); Raymond (2010); Sorabji (2006,
14); Syse (2006, 2010); Bellamy (2006, 29), and Dawson
(1996).
32 Of course, Thucydides’ own thought does not reduce
to the kind of cynical realism that contemporary schol-
ars (many of whom are in international relations) are in-
clined to associate with it (Bagby 1994).
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authority; the jus in bello norm of sanctuary; and, last
but not least, the general character or modality of just
war reasoning itself. On this last point, Xenophon’s con-
ception of just war as an ordering activity offers an in-
triguing and potentially very useful counterpoint to the
very particular and arguably pernicious form that con-
temporary just war reasoning has assumed. As such, it is
an avenue that merits further investigation.
Finally, and more generally, this article has made the
case that scholars who subscribe to the view that the best
way to think about just war is to think about it as a tradi-
tion should exercise their historical imagination by cast-
ing their nets wider and extending their historiography
beyond the standard narratives that bound the field. It
has showcased the utility of this approach by highlighting
how the inclusion of a marginal figure such as Xenophon
can shed new light, or at least offer a revealing perspec-
tive, on questions pertaining to how we think about jus-
tice with respect to war, the conception of war supposed
by the idea of just war, and what it means to think about
just war as a tradition. The hope is that this approach
provides a way for scholars interested in thinking about
just war as a tradition to pursue this task without falling
prey to the pitfalls of traditionalism.
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